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No. 96-10178
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ORLANDO CORDIA HALL,
Defendant-Appellant
Appeal
from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
INITIAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT
CRIMINAL APPEAL
MARCIA A.
WIDDER E
LA Bar No. 23367
Michael R. Needle,
P.C.
2401 Pennsylvania Avenue
Suite 1C-44
Philadelphia, PA 19130
(215) 236-7420
MICHAEL WARE
TX Bar No. 20864200
111 North Houston
Suite 210
Ft. Worth, TX 76102
(817) 338-4100
R. NEAL WALKER
LA Bar No. 22217
636 Baronne Street
New Orleans, LA 70113
(504) 558-9867
Attorneys
for Defendant-Appellant,
Orlando Cordia Hall
CERTIFICATE
OF INTERESTED PERSONS
The undersigned counsel of record certifies that the
following listed persons have an interest in the outcome of this case. These representations are made in order that
the members of this Court may evaluate possible disqualifications or recusal.
District
Judge
Honorable Terry
R. Means
Appellant
Orlando Cordia Hall
Present
and Past Counsel for
Appellant,
Orlando
Cordia Hall
Marcia
A. Widder (appeal)
R. Neal Walker (appeal)
Michael L. Ware (district court; appeal)
Jeffrey A. Kearney (district court)
Michael P. Heiskell (district court)
Mark G. Daniel (district court)
Present
and Past Counsel for Appellee,
United
States of America
Paul E. Coggins (United States
Attorney for the Northern District of
Texas)
Delonia A. Watson (appeal and district court)
Christopher Curtis (appeal and district court)
Richard Roper (district court)
Paul Macaluso (district court)
Marcia A.
Widder
LA Bar No.
23367
Michael R. Needle, P.C.
2401 Pennsylvania Ave.
Suite. 1C-44
Philadelphia, PA 19130
(215) 236-7420
Attorney of record for Appellant,
Orlando Cordia Hall
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Oral argument is requested.
This case presents only the second appeal in this Circuit of a sentence
of death imposed under the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, 18
U.S.C. § 3591
et seq ("FDPA"). It is only
the third appeal in this Circuit of a death penalty imposed since the federal
death penalty was reinstated in 1984, 21
U.S.C. § 848. This appeal raises numerous issues of first
impression regarding the construction of the FDPA and the interaction of other
statutes and rules with that Act.
Additionally, the record is lengthy and many of the issues are fact
intensive. Accordingly, counsel
believes that oral argument would be of assistance to the Court.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS
FEDERAL
STATUTES
FEDERAL
RULES
STATE
STATUTES
LAW
REVIEW ARTICLES
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
STATEMENT
OF THE CASE
A. Proceedings Below
B. Statement of the Facts
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT
I.
THE DISTRICT COURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW HALL TO MAKE A STATEMENT OF REMORSE
BEFORE THE JURY VIOLATED DUE PROCESS, ERRONEOUSLY DENIED HALL THE RIGHT
ACCORDED ALL FEDERAL DEFENDANTS TO ALLOCUTE BEFORE THE SENTENCER, AND WAS AN
ABUSE OF DISCRETION UNDER THE EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS GOVERNING THE PENALTY PHASE
II. THE DISTRICT
COURT VIOLATED HALL'S FIFTH AND EIGHTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN CONDITIONING THE
ADMISSION OF PSYCHIATRIC TESTIMONY ON HALL'S BEHALF TO HIS SUBMISSION TO A
GOVERNMENT PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION PRIOR TO CONVICTION WITHOUT IMPOSING
ANY LIMITATIONS TO SECURE HALL'S
FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
III. THE ADMISSION OF
IRRELEVANT, HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE VIOLATED DUE PROCESS AND THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL JURY AND WAS AN ABUSE OF THE DISTRICT COURT'S
DISCRETION
IV. THE ADMISSION OF
EVIDENCE OF UNADJUDICATED OFFENSES IN THE PENALTY PHASE AND OF LACK INSTRUCTION
THAT THE JURY APPLY SOME BURDEN OF PROOF IN ASSESSING THIS EVIDENCE RENDERED
THE
DEATH SENTENCE UNRELIABLE
V. THE ADMISSION OF
NONTESTIMONIAL VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS DURING THE PENALTY PHASE VIOLATED THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION, DUE PROCESS AND THE FDPA'S EVIDENTIARY
STANDARDS
VI. HALL WAS DENIED
DUE PROCESS OF LAW, AN IMPARTIAL JURY, AND HIS STATUTORY RIGHT TO FREE EXERCISE
OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES DUE TO THE DISTRICT COURT'S REJECTION OF DEFENSE CAUSE
CHALLENGES TO PLAINLY IMPAIRED AND BIASED VENIREPERSONS
VII.
THE JURY'S FAILURE TO FIND THE MITIGATING FACTOR OF "THE CIRCUMSTANCES
SURROUNDING THE DEFENDANT'S UPBRINGING" WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND REQUIRES
THAT THE DEATH SENTENCE BE VACATED
VIII.
AGGRAVATING FACTORS SUBMITTED TO HALL'S JURY WERE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE, OVERBROAD AND/OR
DUPLICATIVE
IX. THE DISTRICT
COURT'S DENIAL OF HALL'S MOTIONS FOR CONTINUANCE DENIED HALL HIS RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS AND EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL UNDER THE
FIFTH AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS
X.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING HALL'S REQUEST TO POLL THE JURY REGARDING A
PREJUDICIAL NEWS REPORT AND DEBATE BROADCAST DURING PENALTY PHASE DELIBERATIONS
XI. THE DISTRICT
COURT ERRED IN DENYING HALL'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS HIS ORAL AND WRITTEN
STATEMENTS AS VIOLATIVE OF HIS FIFTH AND SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND OF
APPLICABLE FEDERAL
CONCLUSION
TABLE
OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Ake v. Oklahoma,
470 U.S. 68 (1985)
Anderson v. United States,
318 U.S. 350 (1943)
Andrews v. Shulsen,
600 F. Supp. 408 (D. Utah 1984), aff'd 802 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 919 (1988)
Arave v. Creech,
507 U.S. 463 (1993)
Arizona v. Roberson,
486 U.S. 675 (1988)
Arizona v. Rumsey,
467 U.S. 203 (1984)
Ashe v. North Carolina,
586 F.2d 334 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 966 (1979)
Ball v. United States,
140 U.S. 118 (1891)
Barclay v. Florida,
463 U.S. 939 (1983)
Berry v. State,
718 S.W.2d 447 (Ark. 1986)
Bivens v. State,
642 N.E.2d 928 (Ind. 1994)
Boardman v. Estelle,
957 F.2d 1523 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 904 (1992)
Bradford v. State,
873 S.W.2d 15 (Tex.Cr.App. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 925 (1994)
Brewer v. Williams,
430 U.S. 387 (1977)
Bruton v. United States,
391 U.S. 123 (1968)
Bullington v. Missouri,
451 U.S. 430 (1981)
Caldwell v. Mississippi,
472 U.S. 320 (1985)
California v. Brown,
479 U.S. 538 (1987)
Cartwright v. Maynard,
822 F.2d 1477 (10th Cir. 1987), aff'd 486 U.S. 356 (1988)
Commonwealth v. Richmond,
358 N.E.2d 999 (Mass. 1976)
Commonwealth v. Scaramuzzino,
317 A.2d 225 (Pa. 1974)
Commonwealth v. Thomas,
553 A.2d 918 (Pa. 1989)
Cook v. State,
369 So.2d 1251 (Ala. 1978)
Cumbo v. State.
760 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. Cr. App. 1988)
DeAngelo v. Schiedler,
757 P.2d 1355 (Or. 1988)
Devier v. Zant,
3 F.3d 1445 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1125 (1995)
Drake v. Kemp,
762 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir. 1985)(en banc), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020 (1986)
Echavarria v. State,
839 P.2d 589 (Nev. 1992)
Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104 (1982)
Edwards v. Arizona,
451 U.S. 477 (1981)
Edwards v. Scroggy,
849 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1059 (1989)
Engberg v. Myer,
820 P.2d 70 (Wyo. 1991)
Enmund v. Florida,
458 U.S. 782 (1982)
Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 (1992)
Estelle v. Smith,
451 U.S. 454 (1981)
Evans v. State,
598 N.E.2d 516 (Ind. 1992)
Gardner v. Florida,
430 U.S. 349 (1977)
Godfrey v. Georgia,
446 U.S. 420 (1980)
Gray v. Lucas,
710 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1983)
Green v. United States,
365 U.S. 301 (1961)
Greene v. Georgia,
117 S. Ct. S. Ct. 578 (1996)
Grooms v. Commonwealth,
756 S.W.2d 131 (Ky. 1988)
Hamilton v. Alabama,
386 U.S. 52 (1961)
Harris v. State,
509 A.2d 120 (Md. 1986)
Hayes v. State,
845 P.2d 890 (Okl.Cr. 1992)
Haywood v. United States,
393 F.2d 780 (5th Cir. 1968)
Herzog v. State,
439 So.2d 1372, 1380 (Fla. 1983)
Hill v. United States,
368 U.S. 424 (1962)
Hitchcock v. Dugger,
481 U.S. 393 (1987)
Holland v. Commonwealth,
703 S.W.2d 876 (Ky. 1985)
Holland v. State,
587 So.2d 848 (Miss. 1991)
Homick v. State,
825 P.2d 600 (Nev. 1992)
Hulsey v. Sargent,
865 F.2d 954 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 923 (1989)
Irvin v. Dowd,
366 U.S. 717 (1961)
Jackson v. State,
451 So.2d 458, 463 (Fla. 1984)
Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307 (1979)
Jones v. State,
381 So.2d 983 (Miss.), cert. denied 449 U.S. 1003 (1980)
Jones v. State,
738 P.2d 525 (Okl.Crim.App. 1987)
Kirk v. Raymark Industries, Inc.,
61 F.3d 147 (3rd Cir. 1995)
Koons v. United States,
116 S. Ct. 2035 (1996)
Kyles v. Whitley,
115 S. Ct. 1555 (1995)
Ladner v. State,
584 So.2d 743 (Miss.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1015 (1991)
Lankford v. Idaho,
500 U.S. 110 (1991)
Leatherman v. Tarrant County
Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S.163
(1993)
Ledbetter v. State,
933 P.2d 880 (Ok.Cr.App. 1997)
Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586 (1978)
Lowenfield v. Phelps,
484 U.S. 231 (1988)
Magwood v. Smith,
791 F.2d 1438 (11th Cir. 1986)
Maynard v. Cartwright,
486 U.S. 356 (1988)
McCoy v. North Carolina,
494 U.S. 433 (1990)
McGautha v. California,
402 U.S. 183 (1971)
Milton v. Procunier,
744 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1030 (1985)
Minnick v. Mississippi,
498 U.S. 146 (1990)
Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992)
Nibert v. State,
574 So.2d 1059 (Fla. 1990)
Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing
Authority v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. of Virginia,
464 U.S. 30 (1983)
Old Chief v. United States,
117 S. Ct. 644 (1997)
Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308 (1991)
Parker v. State,
643 So.2d 1032 (Fla. 1994)
Parsons v. Barns,
871 P.2d 516 (Utah), cert. denied, 513 U.S.966 (1994)
Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U.S. 808 (1991)
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,
480 U.S. 39 (1987)
Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U.S. 302 (1989)
People v. Borrego,
774 P.2d 854 (Colo. 1989)
People v. Clankie,
530 N.E.2d 448 (Ill. 1988)
People v. Davis,
794 P.2d 189 (Colo 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1018 (1991)
Pickens v. State,
730 S.W.2d 230 (Ark.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 917 (1987)
Pope v. State,
345 S.E.2d 831 (Ga. 1986)
Potts v. Zant,
734 F.2d 526 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1068 (1986)
President v. State,
609 P.2d 222 (Okl.Cr.App. 1979)
Presnell v. Georgia,
439 U.S. 333 (1978)
Price v. State,
538 So.2d 486 (Fla.Ct.App. 1989)
Profitt v. Wainwright,
685 F.2d 1227 (11th Cir. 1982), modified, 706 F.2d 311 (11th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1002 & 1003 (1983)
Provence v. State,
337 So.2d 783 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 969 (1977)
Rhodes v. State,
547 So.2d 1201 (Fla. 1989)
Richmond v. Lewis,
506 U.S. 40 (1992)
Ross v. Oklahoma,
487 U.S. 81 (1988)
Sanders v. State,
585 A.2d 117 (Del. 1990)
Schwab v. Berggren,
143 U.S. 442 (1892)
Sermons v. State,
417 S.E.2d 144 (Ga. 1992)
Shell v. Mississippi,
498 U.S. 1 (1990)
Simmons v. United States,
390 U.S. 377 (1968)
Skipper v. State,
364 S.E.2d 835 (Ga. 1988)
Smith v. Black,
904 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, vacated, 503 U.S. 930 (1992)
Smith v. State,
819 P.2d 270 (Okl. Crim. App. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 959 (1992)
State v. Allies,
606 P.2d 1043 (Mont. 1979)
State v. Atwood,
832 P.2d 593 (Ariz. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1084 (1993)
State v. Bartholomew,
683 P.2d 1079 (Wash. 1984)(en banc)
State v. Bernard,
608 So. 2d 966 (La. 1992)
State v. Boyd,
532 P.2d 1064 (Kan. 1975)
State v. Brooks,
541 So.2d 801 (La. 1989)
State v. Carter,
888 P.2d 629 (Utah), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 163 (1995)
State v. Chapple,
660 P.2d 1208 (Ariz. 1983)
State v. Clark,
772 P.2d 322 (N.M.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 923 (1989)
State v. Comeaux,
514 So.2d 84 (La. 1987)
State v. Cross, 658 So.2d 683 (La. 1995)
State v. Divers,
681 So.2d 320 (La. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1461
State v. Hall,
616 So.2d 664 (La. 1993)
State v. Hallal,
557 So.2d 1388 (La. 1990)
State v. Hamlet,
321 S.E.2d 837 (N.C. 1984)
State v. Hunt,
371 N.W.2d 708 (Neb. 1985), overruled on other grounds, 399 N.W.2d 706 (Neb.
1986)
State v. Johnson,
259 S.E.2d 752 (N.C. 1979)
State v. Kirkley,
302 S.E.2d 144 (N.C. 1983)
State v. Loftin,
680 A.2d 677 (N.J.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 949 (1996)
State v. Mak,
718 P.2d 407 (Wash.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995 (1986)
State v. McCall,
698 S.W.2d 643 (Tenn.Cr.App. 1985)
State v. McCall,
770 P.2d 1165 (Ariz. 1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1031 (1990)
State v. Metz,
887 P.2d 795 (Or.Ct.App. 1994)
State v. Nolan,
341 So.2d 885 (La. 1977)
State v. Norris,
328 S.E.2d 339 (S.C. 1985)
State v. Ortiz,
639 P.2d 1020 (Ariz. 1981), 456 U.S. 984 (1982)
State v. Quesinberry,
354 S.E.2d 446 (N.C. 1987), cert. denied, 373 S.E.2d 554 (N.C.
Oct. 6, 1988)
State v. Robertson,
630 So.2d 1278 (La. 1994)
State v. Ross,
623 So.2d 643 (La. 1993)
State v. Salters,
257 S.E.2d 502 (S.C. 1979)
State v. Sonnier,
402 So. 2d 650 (La. 1980)
State v. Strange,
619 So.2d 817 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1993)
State v. Turner,
692 So.2d 612 (La. Ct. App. 1997)
State v. Williams,
550 A.2d 1172 (N.J. 1988)
State v. Young,
853 P.2d 327 (Utah 1993)
State v. Zola,
548 A.2d 1022 (N.J. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022 (1989)
Stringer v. Black,
503 U.S. 222 (1992)
Sumner v. Schuman,
483 U.S. 66 (1987)
Tison v. Arizona,
481 U.S. 137 (1987)
Tobler v. State,
688 P.2d 350 (Okl.Cr.App. 1984)
Tomlinson v. State,
647 P.2d 415 (N.M. 1982)
Ungar v. Sarafite,
376 U.S. 575 (1964)
United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez,
511 U.S. 350 (1994)
United States v. Annigoni,
96 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1996)(en banc)
United States v. Aragon,
962 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1992)
United States v. Arnold,
106 F.3d 37 (3rd Cir. 1997)
United States v. Bay,
762 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir. 1985)
United States v. Beasley,
48 F.3d 262 (7th Cir. 1995)
United States v. Beaulieu,
893 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1038 (1990)
United States v. Beckford,
962 F. Supp.748 (E.D.Va. 1997)
United States v. Bryant,
991 F.2d 171 (5th. Cir. 1993)
United States v. Cannon,
981 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1993)
United States v. Coleman,
997 F.2d 1101, 1104 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1062 & 1077
(1994)
United States v. Cooper,
949 F.2d 737 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 975 (1992)
United States v. Copeland,
830 F. Supp. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
United States v. Courtney,
979 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1992)
United States v. Davis,
61 F.3d 291 (5th Cir. 1995)
United States v. Estrada-Trochez,
66 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 1995)
United States v. Flores,
63 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 87 (1996)
United States v. Gallo,
763 F.2d 1504 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1068 (1986)
United States v. Haworth,
942 F. Supp. 1406 (D.N.M. 1996)
United States v. Jones
(5th Cir. No. 96-10113 c/w 10448)
United States v. King,
664 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1981)
United States v. Laury,
49 F.3d 145 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 162 (1995)
United States v. McCullah,
76 F.3d 1087 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1699 (1997)
United States v. McRae,
593 F.2d 700 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 862 (1979)
United States v. McVeigh,
944 F. Supp. 1478 (D.Colo. 1996)
United States v. Mir,
919 F.2d 940 (5th Cir. 1990)
United States v. Moree,
928 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1991)
United States v. Mitcheltree,
940 F.2d 1329 (10th Cir. 1991)
United States v. Munoz,
15 F.3d 393 (5th. Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2149 (1994)
United States v. North,
910 F.2d 843 (D.C.Cir.), modified, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C.Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
500 U.S. 825 & 941 (1991)
United States v. Palacio,
735 F. Supp. 484 (D.Conn. 1990)
United States v. Poston,
902 F.2d 90 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
United States v. Pretlow,
779 F. Supp. 758 (D.N.J. 1991)
United States v. Rodriguez,
993 F.2d 1170 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1547 (1994)
United States v. Spagnuolo,
960 F.2d 990 (11th Cir. 1992)
United States v. Taylor,
92 F.3d 1313 (2nd Cir. 1996)
United States v. Tipton,
90 F.3d 861 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2414 (1997)
United States v. Verderame,
51 F.3d 249 (11th Cir.1995)
United States v. Vest,
905 F. Supp. 651 (W.D.Mo. 1995)
United States v. Washington,
44 F.3d 1271 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 2011 (1995)
United States v. Williams,
993 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1993)
United States v. Williams,
809 F.2d 1072 (5th Cir.), modified, 828 F.2d (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 484 U.S.
896, 913 & 987 (1987)
United States v. Wilson,
838 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1988)
Wainwright v. Witt,
469 U.S. 412 (1985)
Ward v. Whitley,
21 F.3d 1355 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1257 (1995)
Wardius v. Oregon,
412 U.S. 470 (1973)
Williams v. Whitley,
940 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1991)
Wilson v. Kemp,
777 F.2d 621 (11th Cir. 1985, cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1153 (1986)
Zant v. Stephens,
462 U.S. 862 (1983)
CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS
U.S. CONST. amend. V
U.S. CONST. amend. VI
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII
FEDERAL
STATUTES
18 U.S.C. § 2
18 U.S.C. § 1073
18 U.S.C. § 1201
18 U.S.C. § 3005
18 U.S.C. § 3231
18 U.S.C. § 3501
18 U.S.C. § 3552
18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)
18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)
18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)
18 U.S.C. § 3593
18 U.S.C. § 3593(a)
18 U.S.C. § 3593(c)
18 U.S.C. § 3593(e)
18
U.S.C. § 3595(a)
18 U.S.C. § 3595(b)
18 U.S.C. § 3595(c)
18 U.S.C. § 4241
18 U.S.C. § 4242
21 U.S.C. § 848 iii,
28 U.S.C. § 1291
FEDERAL RULES
Fed.R. Crim.P. 5
Fed.R.A.P. 4
Fed.R.Crim.P. 10
Fed.R.Crim.P. 12.2
Fed.R.Crim.P. 24(b)
Fed.R.Crim.P. 32
Fed.R.Evid. 403
STATE
STATUTES
Ga.
Code. Ann. § 17-10-30(7)
LAW
REVIEW ARTICLES
Paul W. Barrett, Allocution, 9 Mo.L.Rev. 115, 117-18 (1944)
Steven Paul Smith, Unreliable and Prejudicial: The
Use of Extraneous Unadjudicated Offenses in the Penalty Phases of Capital
Trials, 93 Col. L. Rev. 1249 (1993)
J. Thomas Sullivan, The Capital Defendant's Right to Make a
Personal Plea for Mercy: Common Law
Allocution and Constitutional Mitigation, 15 N.M. L. Rev. 41 (1985)
I. STATEMENT
OF JURISDICTION
The district court had jurisdiction of this action pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, as this is an appeal
from a final judgment entered by the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas.
Jurisdiction also lies under 18
U.S.C. § 3595(a). Notice of appeal was timely given in
accordance with Fed.R.A.P. 4(b).
II. STATEMENT
OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I. Whether the trial
court's refusal to allow Hall the right to make a brief statement in allocution
before the jury requires reversal of the death sentence.
II. Whether the trial
court reversibly erred in conditioning Hall's submission of psychiatric
testimony during the penalty phase upon his submission to a mental health
examination by government experts prior to the guilt phase.
III. Whether the
trial court erred in admitting irrelevant, highly prejudicial evidence in the
guilt and penalty phases.
IV. Whether admission
of evidence of unadjudicated offenses in the penalty phase without any
instruction to apply some burden of proof to the evidence rendered the death
sentence unreliable.
V. Whether the trial
court erred in admitting nontestimonial victim impact statements in the penalty
phase.
VI. Whether the trial
court erroneously rejected meritorious cause challenges.
VII. Whether the
jury's failure to find that "the circumstances surrounding the defendant's
upbringing" were a mitigating factor was clearly erroneous.
VIII.
Whether aggravating factors submitted to the jury were unconstitutionally
vague, overbroad and/or duplicative.
IX. Whether the trial
court abused its discretion in denying Hall's motions for a continuance.
X. Whether the trial
court erred in refusing to poll the jury about a prejudicial news report
broadcast during penalty deliberations.
XI. Whether the
district court erred in admitting Hall's incriminating oral and written
statements.
III. STATEMENT
OF THE CASE
Note: References to the record and supplemental
record on appeal are made as "R. [volume #]:[page #]" and "S.R.
[page #]" respectively. References
to record excerpts are made as "R.E. Tab [#]." Government exhibits
introduced at trial, and court exhibits contained in the record, are referred
to as "G.E. [#]" and "C.E. [#], respectively. A few documents not part of this record are
appended as exhibits hereto.
A.
PROCEEDINGS BELOW
On October 26, 1994, the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Texas issued a criminal complaint charging Bruce
Webster, Orlando Hall, Steven Beckley and Demetrius Hall with kidnapping and
aiding and abetting, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(1) and
2.
R. 1:1. On November 4, 1994, a
six-count superseding indictment was returned, charging Webster, Hall,
Demetrius Hall, Beckley, and Marvin Holloway with kidnapping in which a death
occurred, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(1) and 2 (Count 1), and various noncapital
charges. R. 1:37-45; R.E. Tab 2. The
government, on February 23, 1995, filed notice of its intention to seek the
death penalty against Hall under the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, 18
U.S.C. § 3591 et seq ("FDPA").1 R. 1:82-87; R.E. Tab 3.
On March 9, 1995, Hall's attorneys, Michael Heiskell and
Mark Daniel, withdrew as counsel. On
March 31, 1995, Michael Ware and Jeffrey Kearney were appointed as Hall's new
counsel. On August 10, 1995, the
district court denied the first of Hall's motions for a continuance. See
Docket Sheet; R.E. Tab 1. Subsequent
requests for a continuance made orally during the trial were also denied.2 See
id.
Trial commenced on October 2, 1995. A jury was empanelled
following voir dire
conducted from October 2-19, 1995. See Docket Sheet, R.E. Tab 1. From October 24-31, 1995, Hall was tried by
the jury before Hon. Terry R. Means. Id.
On October 31, 1995, the jury found Hall guilty on counts 1, 2, 3 and
6. R. 6:1332-33; R.E. Tab 4. From November 1-3, 1995, the same jury that
decided guilt/innocence heard testimony and argument in the penalty phase. See
Docket Sheet, R.E. Tab 1. On November
6, 1995, the jury returned a verdict of death on Count 1. See
Special Findings Form. R. 6:1377-1389;
R.E. Tab 5.
A timely motion for a new trial was denied on December 8,
1995. R. 6:1458. After the district court entered judgment on
February 21, 1996, R. 6:1469-72; R.E. Tab 6,3
Hall filed a timely Notice of Appeal of the conviction and sentence on each
count, R. 6:1467-68; R.E. Tab 7, and
the appeal docketed as number 96-10178 in this Court followed.
B.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Guilt/Innocence Phase:
The evidence presented at the guilt/ innocence phase of the trial,
largely through the testimony of Demetrius Hall, Beckley and Holloway,4
indicated the following:
Hall and Holloway, together with Webster, operated a local
marijuana selling business in Pine Bluff, Arkansas, out of Holloway's
home. They bought marijuana in varying
amounts in the Dallas/Fort Worth area with the assistance of Beckley, who lived
in Irving, Texas. The marijuana was
then transported, usually by Beckley, to Arkansas and kept at Holloway's
home. R. 26:152, 27:100-27; 29:16-28.
On September 21, 1994, Holloway drove Hall from Pine Bluff
to Little Rock, Arkansas, so that Hall could fly to the Dallas/Fort Worth
area. There, Hall met his brother,
Demetrius Hall, and Beckley. That same
day, the three were swindled out of $5,000 by two drug dealers, Stanfield
Vitales and Neil Rene, who are brothers of the victim, Lisa Rene. R. 28:73, 75. The Halls and Beckley decided to locate Vitales and Rene and
force them to return the money. R. 27:
130-53. Hall contacted Holloway in
Arkansas and asked him to send Webster down to help because "he knew how
to handle things like this." R.
26:153.
On September 24, 1994, Holloway drove Webster to the airport
in Little Rock and Webster flew to the Dallas/Fort Worth area. That evening, the four went to an apartment
located at the Polo Runs Apartments in Arlington, Texas, where they had
determined that Vitalis and Rene lived.
Hall and Webster were armed with guns procurred by Beckley, and
Demetrius Hall carried a small baseball bat.
When the occupant of the apartment would not open the door, Demetrius
Hall and Webster went around to the side.
Demetrius Hall broke the patio glass door with the bat and Webster went
into the apartment and dragged Lisa Rene out to the car. Hall and Beckley had already run to the car
when they heard the sound of glass breaking.
Webster forced Lisa Rene into the car and the five drove off. R. 26:160-72, 27:156-72.
That same evening, Webster, Demetrius Hall and Beckley drove
Lisa Rene to Pine Bluff, Arkansas, where they obtained money from Holloway to
get a hotel room. R. 26:181-89. Hall remained in Irving and flew to Little Rock
the next day. Holloway picked him up
and drove him to the hotel where Lisa Rene was being held by the others. The next day they moved to another hotel
using money received from Holloway. R.
26:206.
Throughout the abduction, each of the defendants sexually
assaulted Lisa Rene. R. 27:166-67,
170-73; 175-79.
Early in the morning of October 26, 1994, Webster, Beckley
and Hall took Lisa Rene to a site in Byrd Lake Park where a grave had been dug.5 All three struck her on the head and
shoulders with a shovel (between five and fifteen times), most likely rendering
her unconscious. R. 27:193-98; 29:139,
144. Webster put her in the grave,
re-moved her clothes, gagged her and poured gasoline over her body. R. 27:199-202. She was buried in a four foot deep grave where she died.
Beckley, Demetrius Hall and Webster were subsequently
arrested. On September 30, 1994, Hall
surrendered to the Pine Bluff authorities in the presence of his attorney. R. 27:15-16. On advice of counsel, he did not give a statement at the time,
but indicated that he would talk with the agents after he was transported to
Texas. R. 27:20. On October 5, 1994, following his transfer
to Arlington County Jail, he gave a written statement to FBI and Arlington
County agents in which he substantially implicated himself in the kidnapping
and murder. R. 27:35-59; G.E. 88. Hall was twenty-three years old at the time
of the offense. R. 1:11.
The Penalty Phase: At the penalty phase, the government introduced
additional evidence and/or argument in support of the mental state elements
required by 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a) and six aggravating
factors for which it had given notice.6 The defense presented
uncontroverted evidence that Hall had grown up in an abusive environment in
which his father constantly and brutally beat his mother from
before his birth until his parents divorced when Hall was about 15 years
old. R. 32:113-17; 138-39. The defense also presented evidence of
Hall's good relationship with his four children, R. 31:100-01, 32:140, and his
remorse over his role in the abduction and murder. R. 32:141-42.
The district court charged the jury on the following
mitigating factors: (1) equally culpable co-defendants would not be punished by
death, 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(4); (2) Hall's age at
the time of the offense; (3) the "circumstances surrounding defendant's
upbringing;" (4) Hall's acceptance of responsibility for his role in the
offense; (5) Hall's remorse; and (6) any other aspect of Hall's character or
background which calls for a sentence less than death.7
After deliberating, the jury returned a sentence of
death. See Special Findings Form, R. 6:1377-89; R.E. Tab 5. The jury unanimously found two of the
required mental state elements. The
jury also found the statutory aggravating factors that the death occurred
during the commission of a kidnapping and that the killing was especially
heinous, cruel or depraved, and the nonstatutory aggravating factors of future
dangerousness and the "effect" on the victim's family. The determination of mitigating factors were
as follows: Nine jurors found that one
or more equally culpable defendants would not receive the death penalty; the
mitigating factors of the defendant's age, upbringing, and "any other
aspect calling for a sentence less than death" received the support of one
juror. See id. R. 6:1377-89.
IV.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The district court's rulings in this capital case
arbitrarily precluded the defense from presenting relevant mitigating
information in the penalty phase--denying Hall the right of allocution before
the jury (Issue I) and precluding the introduction of psychiatric testimony on
his behalf (Issue II). At the same
time, the court allowed the government virtually free rein to present
excessively gruesome photographs and a video tape (Issue III) and hearsay
victim impact statements (Issue V). The
court, moreover, allowed the jury to consider questionable evidence of
unadjudicated offenses without applying any standard of proof to the evidence
of such conduct (Issue IV).
The district court's improper rulings on cause challenges
compounded these errors. The district
court rejected meritorious cause challenges of jurors who were unable to fairly
consider mitigating evidence and/or whose pro-death penalty positions rendered
them incapable of giving adequate consideration to a sentence of life without
the possibility of release (Issue VI).
These rulings contributed to the jury's erroneous rejection
of uncontroverted, credible evidence of Hall's turbulent childhood (Issue
VII). Moreover, the court improperly
submitted aggravating factors that were constitutionally overbroad and vague
and that impermissibly duplicated each other and the charged offense (Issue
VIII).
Finally, the district court's denial of defense motions for
a continuance (while granting a continuance to Hall's co-defendant) (Issue IX)
and to poll the jury regarding a prejudicial news report broadcast during
penalty deliberations (Issue X), and failure to suppress Hall's uncounseled,
post-indictment statements (Issue XI) require that the conviction and/or death
sentence be vacated.
V.
ARGUMENT
I. THE DISTRICT COURT'S
REFUSAL TO ALLOW HALL TO MAKE A STATEMENT OF REMORSE BEFORE THE JURY VIOLATED
DUE PROCESS, ERRONEOUSLY DENIED HALL THE RIGHT ACCORDED ALL FEDERAL DEFENDANTS
TO ALLOCUTE BEFORE THE SENTENCER, AND WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION UNDER THE
EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS GOVERNING THE PENALTY PHASE
A.
Background
The district court granted the government a wide berth in
its presentation of information in the penalty phase of the trial -- even
admitting hearsay victim impact statements written by individuals who did not
testify. See 4:32:36-37; G.E. 110A & 110C; R.E. Tab 15. The district court did not, however, extend
the same liberal standard when ruling on the admissibility of mitigating
information Hall sought to introduce.
In particular, the district court refused to allow Hall to make a brief
plea for forgiveness and mercy before the jury charged with determining whether
he lived or died.
At the conclusion of the government's penalty phase
case-in-chief, the defense moved the district court to permit Hall to exercise
his right of allocution before the jury.
R. 32:45-50, R.E. Tab 8. The
district court denied the motion, holding that Fed.R.Crim.P. 32 does not apply in capital
sentencing proceedings and apparently accepting the government's argument that
there is no common law right of allocution.
R. 32:49-50, R.E. Tab 8. The
defense later submitted an offer of proof, R. 6:1445; R.E.
Tab 9, indicating that Hall had been prepared to give the following statement:
I want to apologize to my family and ask them to forgive me,
and I hope somehow they can forgive me.
I want to apologize to Lisa Rene's family and ask them to forgive me,
even though I know that there is no possible way they can forgive me and I
understand that. I want to ask God to
forgive me, however, I question in my own mind whether even God can forgive me.
The trial court's refusal to permit Hall to present this
statement in mitigation of punishment, while allowing the government to present
in aggravation like information, was fundamentally unfair and violated due
process. The court's ruling, moreover,
erroneously deprived Hall of the right afforded every federal defendant convicted of a noncapital crime to make a
statement in allocution before the sentencer and was an abuse of discretion
under the liberal evidentiary standards set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 3593(c). This grave procedural
error requires that the sentence of death be vacated.8
B. Argument
1. The court's
failure to accord Hall the same right to present non-testimonial statements in
mitigation that it granted the government in presenting aggravating information
violated due process.
The trial court refused to permit Hall to stand before the
jury to make a statement in mitigation of punishment, while admitting comparable nontestimonial statements offered by the government in
aggravation. There is no relevant
distinction between the information both sides sought to introduce -- both the
victim impact statements and Hall's proposed allocution were statements not
subject to cross-examination offered to aid the jury in reaching its sentencing
determination.9 The district court's failure to accord equal
treatment to the defense was fundamentally unfair and violated due process.
It is elemental that due process "speak[s] to the
balance of forces between the accused and his accuser." Wardius
v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 744 (1973).
Courts have thus been "particularly suspicious of state trial rules
which provide nonreciprocal benefits to the State when the lack of reciprocity
interferes with the defendant's ability to secure a fair trial." Id.
at 474 n.6. Consequently, in Wardius, the Supreme Court held that
"the Due Process Clause ... forbids enforcement of alibi rules unless
reciprocal discovery rights are given to criminal defendants." Id.
at 472. In reversing the petitioner's
conviction because Oregon's notice-of-alibi rule failed to provide such rights,
the Court observed:
[I]n the absence of a strong showing of state interests to
the contrary, discovery must be a two-way street. The State may not insist that trial be run as a "search for
truth" so far as defense witnesses are concerned while maintaining
"poker game" secrecy for its own witnesses. It is fundamentally unfair to require a defendant to divulge the
details of his own case while at the same time subjecting him to the hazard of
surprise concerning refutation of the very pieces of evidence which he
disclosed to the State.
Id.
at 475-76.
Similarly, in
United
States v. Bay, 762 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir. 1985), the Ninth Circuit determined
that the trial judge had erred in concluding that the defendant's proposed
display of tattoos on his hands to impeach eyewitness testimony would
constitute testimony requiring the defendant to take the stand. The court noted that such evidence "has
been repeatedly held [to be nontestimonial] in cases in which the government
seeks to compel a defendant to show various types of physical characteristics
to the jury" and that "[i]f this can be compelled by the government
when it is to the government's advantage, surely the defendant can make the
same showing without taking the stand."
Id.
at 1315.
Here, the district court refused to apply the same standard
in ruling on the admissibility of comparable information proffered by the
government and Hall. Its failure to do
so precluded Hall from making a plea for mercy before the sentencing jury,
while permitting the government to submit statements by Lisa Rene's family and
friends to support imposition of a death sentence. Such disparate treatment violated due process and requires that
the sentence of death be vacated.
2. The court erred in
concluding Hall had no right of allocution.
The district court rested its decision on the conclusion
that Hall had no right of allocution.
As a matter of common, statutory and constitutional law, this ruling was
erroneous.10
The common law right of allocution, now codified at
Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(3)(C),11originated specifically to allow those convicted of cap-ital offenses the means
to inform the sentencer of any legal infirmity precluding the imposition of the
death sentence. See, e.g., Schwab
v. Berggren, 143 U.S. 442, 447 (1892); Ball
v. United States, 140 U.S. 118, 129-130 (1891). The right "refers to a convicted defendant's opportunity to
speak before sentencing, although historically the 'allocution' referred specifically
to the judge's solemn question to the prisoner at the bar whether the prisoner
knew any reason why judgment should not be pronounced upon her." DeAngelo
v. Schiedler, 757 P.2d 1355, 1356 n. 1 (Ore. 1988).
"While the common law may have strictly limited the
doctrine to the right of the accused to interpose any legal bar to
pronouncement and execution of sentence, allocution has evolved as a legal
concept relating to the accused's right to make a personal plea for mitigation
of punishment." J. Thomas Sullivan, The Capital Defendant's Right to Make a Personal Plea for Mercy: Common Law Allocution and Constitutional
Mitigation, 15 N.M. L. Rev. 41, 56-57 (1985). See also
Paul W. Barrett, Allocution, 9 Mo.L.Rev. 115, 117-18 (1944).
In noncapital cases, allocution has remained a vibrant and
absolute right of a federal criminal defendant once convicted and facing the
sentencing authority, denial of which requires that the sentence be vacated and
the case remanded for resentencing. See, e.g., United
States v. Washington, 44 F.3d 1271, 1276 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1132 (1995). As the Supreme Court stated in
Green
v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 (1961), in
addressing the continued vitality of that right as codified at Fed.R.Crim.P.
32(a)(now Fed.R. Crim.P. 32(c)(3)(C)): "None of the[] modern innovations
[in criminal procedure] lessens the need for the defendant, personally, to have
the opportunity to present to the court his plea in mitigation. The most persuasive counsel may not be able
to speak for a defendant as the defendant might, with halting eloquence, speak
for himself."
The district court's conclusion that neither Rule 32 nor the
common law right of allocution applies in the context of capital sentencing was
in error. First, Leatherman
v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit,
507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). Cf. People
v. Borrego, 774 P.2d 854, 856 (Colo.
1989)(rejecting argument that because allocution was not mentioned in state's
capital sentencing procedures, the statutory right of allocution did not apply,
and noting that "a defendant's right to allocution is even more pronounced
when facing the possibility of a death sentence....");
State
v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 371 (Utah 1993)(Opinion of Justice
Durham)(observing that the State had conceded that Utah's general right of
allocution required court to allow capital defendant to speak to the jury).12
Moreover, regardless of the applicability of
Norfolk
Redevelopment and Housing Authority v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co.
of Virginia, 464 U.S. 30, 35 (1983)(citation
omitted). Cf. Harris
v. State, 509 A.2d 120, 124-25 (Md. 1986)(ruling that the silence of the
Maryland Rules as to the right of allocution in a capital case meant that
"the right of allocution in capital cases reverted to the common law of
Maryland."). Indeed, it would be
absurd to conclude that a common law right that evolved specifically to
mitigate against the harshness of capital sentencing has been preserved solely
for defend-ants who face less severe punishment simply because the right has
been statutorily preserved only as a general rule of criminal
sentencing.13
The trial court's affirmative denial of Hall's right of
allocution, moreover, is of constitutional dimension. Other courts have held that the denial of a defendant's request
to allocute violates United
States v. Moree, 928 F.2d 654, 656 (5th Cir.
1991)("[W]e have consistently held that a defendant's rights to be present
and to allocute at sentencing, which are of constitutional dimension, extend to
resentencing proceedings.").14
Further, the
Eighth Amendment mandates that a capital
defendant be permitted to present and the sentencer be permitted to consider
any evidence in mitigation of punishment.
See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989);
The trial court was technically correct
in instructing the jury that allocution is not evidence. The right to allocute is no more than the
defendant's "right to stand before the jury and ask in his own voice that
he be spared." State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 409, 548
A.2d 1022, 1045 (1988). Allocution is
not a fact to be proved or disproved.
However, in the sentencing phase of a capital case, the jury is not
limited to consideration of matters technically defined as evidence. In making the profoundly moral decision of whether to impose a sentence of death,
it must consider all the facts and circumstances of the crime, the defendant's
background and character and any mitigating factors raised by the
defendant. Plainly, the jury's
deliberations are not limited to assessing technical evidence.
People
v. Davis, 794 P.2d 159, 192 (Colo. 1990)(emphasis added); see Penry,
supra 492 U.S. at 319 ("the sentence imposed at the penalty stage should
reflect a reasoned moral response to
the defendant's background, character and crime.")(emphasis original);
State v. Loftin, 680 A.2d 677, 710
(N.J.)(observing in capital case that "the purpose of allocution is
twofold. First, it reflects our
commonly-held belief that our civilization should afford every defendant an
opportunity to ask for mercy. Second,
it permits a defendant to impress a jury with his or her feelings of
remorse.")(citation omitted), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 949 (1996). The
trial court's refusal to allow Hall to allocute thus contravenes the Eighth
Amendment's clear command that a capital defendant must be allowed to submit
any factor in mitigation for the sentencer's consideration.15
3. Under the FDPA's evidentiary standards, the court abused its discretion in denying Hall the right to make a statement to the jury
18
U.S.C. § 3593(c) establishes a liberal standard for admission
of "information" in the penalty phase, providing, in pertinent part:
[I]nformation may be presented as to any matter relevant to
the sentence, including any mitigating or aggravating factor permitted or
required to be considered under section 3592.... The defendant may present any information relevant to a
mitigating factor. The government may
present any information relevant to an aggravating factor for which notice has
been provided under subsection (a).
Information is admissible regardless of its admissibility under the
rules governing admission of evidence at criminal trials except that
information may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger
of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury.
Hall's proffered allocution constituted information relevant
to the mitigating factors of remorse and acceptance of responsibility. Nothing about the statement created any risk
of unfair prejudice to the government, confusion of the issues or misleading of
the jury. Certainly, Hall's proposed
statement was no more likely to prejudice, confuse or mislead than were the
victim impact statements offered by the government. The court thus abused its discretion in refusing to permit Hall
to make a brief statement in allocution to the jury.
4. The district
court's refusal to allow Hall to present a statement in
mitigation requires that the death sentence be vacated.
The denial of Hall's request for allocution requires
reversal of his sentence. In this Circuit,
the denial of a noncapital defendant's right of allocution is automatic ground
for reversal. See United
States v. Washington, 44 F.3d 1271, 1276 (5th Cir. 1993) cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1132 (1995); Haywood
v. United States, 393 F.2d 780, 782 (5th Cir. 1968)(per curiam). The same rule should apply in capital cases
-- at least where, as here, the defendant requests and is denied the right to
allocute before the jury.
Moreover, assuming arguendo that this error is appropriately
scrutinized under harmless error analysis, the district court's denial of
allocution cannot be deemed harmless.
"What effect the exercise of the right of allocution might have on
the subjective process of sentencing can never be known with such certainty
that a reviewing court can conclude there was no prejudice in its
absence." Commonwealth
v. Thomas, 553 A.2d 918, 919 (Pa. 1989).
In this case, every member of the jury was unpersuaded that the
mitigating factors of remorse and acceptance of responsibility, were proved by
a preponderance of the evidence. See Special Findings Form. R. 6:1382, R.E. Tab 5. Hall's personal statement to the jury spoke
directly to these issues and would have provided the jurors invaluable insight
into Hall's state of mind. As Justice
Durham observed,16in
stressing the import |